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In this paper we compare the profitability of a merger to the profitability of a partial 
ownership arrangement and find that partial ownership arrangements can be more profitable 
for the acquiring and acquired firm because they can result in a greater dampening of 
competition. We also derive comparative statics on the prices of the acquiring firm, the 
acquired firm, and the outside firms. In a dual context, we show that a cross-majority owner 
may have incentives to sell a fraction of the shares in one of the firms he controls to a silent 
investor who is outside the industry. Aggregate ex post operating profit in the two firms 
controlled by the cross-majority shareholder then increases, such that both the cross-majority 
shareholder and the silent investor will be better off with than without the partial divestiture. 
JEL-Code: L13, L22, L82. 






Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 
Department of Economics 
Helleveien 30 
Norway - 5045 Bergen 
oystein.foros@nhh.no 
 
Hans Jarle Kind 
Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration 
Department of Economics 
Helleveien 30 




William E. Simon Graduate School 
University of Rochester  
RC Box 270100 




There is a vast literature on the competitive e⁄ects of mergers. In this literature, the
acquiring ￿rm is assumed to have control over both the pricing and output decisions
of the acquired ￿rm (corporate control). There is also a large literature that looks
at the competitive e⁄ects of partial ownership arrangements while assuming that
the acquiring ￿rm does not obtain corporate control.1 However, as emphasized by
O￿ Brien and Salop (2000) in their seminal work, an acquiring ￿rm may achieve cor-
porate control without having obtained 100% ￿nancial control. They then proceed
to link the two strands of literature by analyzing the competitive e⁄ects of partial
ownership arrangements in which the acquiring ￿rm assumes corporate control.
A main result in their model is that when an acquiring ￿rm has control over its
rival￿ s pricing decision, but less than 100% ownership stake, the welfare e⁄ects can
be worse than a complete merger. In the extreme, the acquiring ￿rm might ￿nd it
optimal not to sell the acquired ￿rm￿ s product so as to maximize the pro￿t on its
own product.2 The intuition for O￿ Brien and Salop￿ s result is that an acquiring ￿rm
with only a small ￿nancial interest in the acquired ￿rm achieves the bene￿ts from
reduced competition when the latter charges high prices but pays only a fraction
of the costs of the reduced pro￿t in the acquired ￿rm. There is thus a free-rider
problem since the acquired ￿rm makes a lower pro￿t than it would otherwise make.3
Missing from their analysis, however, is a discussion of why the ￿rms might agree
to such an arrangement in the ￿rst place, and thus whether such arrangements might
arise in equilibrium. In this paper, we follow O￿ Brien and Salop￿ s lead by looking
1Reynolds and Snapp (1986) and Bresnahan and Salop (1986) were the ￿rst two articles in this
area. They analyze the competitive e⁄ects of partial-equity interests in competing ￿rms under the
assumption of Cournot competition in the product market. They show that the e⁄ects of a partial
ownership in a rival depend critically on whether corporate control is transferred to the acquiring
￿rm or not. See also Flath (1989; 1991), Malueg (1992), Reitman (1994), and Gilo et al (2006).
2This is formally shown by Nye (1992) in a model with Cournot competition.
3This principle of using the ￿nancial and corporate structure of a ￿rm as a commitment device
in order to a⁄ect rival ￿rms￿product-market behavior is quite general, and the model structure
relates to the seminal paper on strategic delegation by Fershtman and Judd (1987). Brander and
Lewis (1986) analyze how a ￿rm may choose the ￿nancial structure (the degree of debt) as a
credible commitment to engage in aggressive product market behavior in the context of Cournot
competition. Showalter (1995) analyzes the choice of debt as a commitment device to nonaggressive
behavior under entry accommodation and price competition (see Tirole (2006) for an overview).
1at partial ownership arrangements in which the acquiring ￿rm obtains corporate
control in the acquired ￿rm￿ but we di⁄er in that we endogenize the ownership
stake that maximizes the joint pro￿ts of the two ￿rms. If these are the only ￿rms
in the market, then joint pro￿ts are clearly maximized when they merge. However,
as we show, when there are more than two ￿rms in the market, the pricing e⁄ects
that result from a partial ownership arrangement can dampen competition and be
su¢ ciently strong that the arrangement actually yields a higher joint pro￿t for the
two ￿rms. Moreover, we show that the other owners of the acquired ￿rm (silent
investors) bene￿t from the transaction, as do also the other ￿rms in the market.
To put this in a dual context, we show that a cross-majority owner may have
incentives to sell a fraction of the shares in one of the ￿rms he controls to a silent
investor who is outside the industry. We show that this may be pro￿table under price
competition, and that there need not be a free-riding problem. Since the joint pro￿t
of the ￿rms that are controlled by the cross-majority shareholder increases, the cross-
majority shareholder and the silent investor will be better o⁄with than without the
partial divestiture. The other ￿rms in the market will respond by increasing their
prices and will also bene￿t. A partial divestiture will thus be detrimental to those
consumers that buy either from the ￿rm where the partial divestiture is undertaken
or from the rival ￿rms. Consumers that buy from the ￿rm in which the cross-
majority shareholder still holds all the ￿nancial interests are, however, better o⁄.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we specify a general
set-up and derive preliminary results. We then provide an example in section 3 using
a Salop circle model of demand to show that partial ownership arrangements can be
optimal ￿and indeed are always optimal ￿in the example. In section 4, we apply the
model to observations in the pay-TV market in Scandinavia. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model and preliminary results
There are three ￿rms in the market. We focus on a setting in which a ￿rm acquires
an ownership stake in one of its rivals and obtains control over the rival￿ s pricing
decision. Without loss of generality, let ￿rm 1 be the acquiring ￿rm, ￿rm 2 be the
2￿rm whose pricing decision is now controlled by ￿rm 1, and ￿rm 3 be the outside
￿rm, whose response to the acquisition of ￿rm 2 by ￿rm 1 will be key to the analysis.
The consumers perceive the goods produced by the three ￿rms as di⁄erentiated.
To focus on market power e⁄ects only, we assume there are no realized cost
savings as a result of the acquisition. We also assume that ￿rms compete by simul-
taneously choosing prices. Let ￿i(p) denote ￿rm i￿ s pro￿t as a function of the vector
of prices, where p = (p1;p2;p3), and let ￿ ￿ 1 denote the ownership stake in ￿rm
2 that is acquired by ￿rm 1. Then, given our assumption on corporate control, it
follows that in the ensuing pricing game, ￿rm 1 will choose p1 and p2 to maximize
max
p1;p2
￿1(p) + ￿￿2(p); (1)




We assume that pro￿ts are continuous and di⁄erentiable, and that all second-order
conditions are satis￿ed. We further make the standard assumption that own-pricing
e⁄ects dominate cross-pricing e⁄ects, and that pricing decisions are strategic com-
plements (a la Bulow et al, 1985), i.e., that reaction functions are upward sloping.4
With these assumptions, we obtain the following comparative-static result.
Proposition 1 Suppose products 1 and 2 are symmetrically di⁄erentiated and have
identical costs of production. Fix ￿rm 3￿ s price at p3. Then, for ￿ su¢ ciently close
to one, ￿rm 1￿ s pro￿t-maximizing choice of p1 (p2) is increasing (decreasing) in ￿.
Proof: See the appendix.
General comparative static results are di¢ cult to obtain when products are dif-
ferentiated. Nevertheless, with enough symmetry and for ￿ su¢ ciently close to one,
Proposition 1 o⁄ers some insight into how ￿rm 1￿ s pro￿t-maximizing prices may vary
as a function of ￿. As ￿rm 1￿ s ownership share of ￿rm 2 increases, relatively more
4More formally, let ￿12(p;￿) ￿ ￿1(p) + ￿￿2(p). Then, for all ￿ ￿ 1 and i;j = 1;2, i 6= j, we
assume @2￿12=@p2
1 < 0, @2￿12=@pi@pj > 0, @2￿12=@p2
2 < 0, @2￿3=@p2
3 < 0, and @2￿3=@p3@pi > 0.
3weight is put on ￿2 in the maximand of (1). Since ￿2 is increasing in p1, it follows
that all else being equal (i.e., holding p2 and p3 constant) p1 will be increasing in
￿. Similarly, as ￿rm 1￿ s ownership share of ￿rm 2 increases, relatively less weight is
placed on ￿1 in the maximand of (1). Since ￿1 is increasing in p2, it follows that
all else being equal (i.e., holding p1 and p3 constant), p2 will be decreasing in ￿.
The condition in Proposition 1 that ￿ be su¢ ciently close to one ensures that
when p2 is allowed to vary, the above e⁄ect of ￿ on p1 continues to hold, and similarly
that when p1 is allowed to vary, the above e⁄ect of ￿ on p2 continues to hold.
The net implication of these ￿ndings is that by acquiring less than 100% of ￿rm
2, ￿rm 1 can credibly commit to setting a higher p2 and a lower p1 than the prices
that would maximize ￿rm 1 and 2￿ s joint pro￿t for any given p3. Whether this will
induce more or less aggressive behavior from ￿rm 3 is the main question we address.
2.1 The trade-o⁄ of partial ownership
A trade-o⁄ arises if the commitment would induce less aggressive behavior on the
part of ￿rm 3. In this case, purchasing less than 100% of ￿rm 2 will yield a favorable
response by ￿rm 3, but will come at the expense of not fully internalizing the pricing
externalities between products 1 and 2. To capture the essence of this trade-o⁄, we
now allow p3 to vary and let p￿
1(￿), p￿
2(￿), and p￿
3(￿) denote the Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium prices as a function of ￿. We want to know whether the joint-pro￿t
maximization of ￿rm 1 and 2￿ s pro￿t always occurs at ￿ = 1, as is implicitly assumed

















































































for all ￿ ￿ 1. Then, it follows immediately from (3) in this case that ￿ = 1 is a local
maximum. And, indeed, it is a global maximum as ￿rm 1 obviously cannot do any
better than to acquire all of ￿rm 2 in this case. Notice, however, that if at ￿ = 1,
dp￿
3
d￿ < 1, then it cannot be pro￿t maximizing for ￿rm 1 to acquire all of ￿rm 2. This
follows because then the ￿rst-order condition as given in (3) would be negative.
More generally, even if
dp￿
3
d￿ = 0 at ￿ = 1, so that ￿ = 1 is a local maximum,
it need not follow that ￿ = 1 is a global maximum. In the case of the Hotelling
demand that we consider in the next section, for example,
dp￿
3
d￿ = 0 at ￿ = 1, and
yet, as we will show, the global maximum always occurs at ￿ < 1. In this case, it
turns out that ￿rm 3￿ s price is decreasing in ￿ when evaluated at ￿ < 1, implying
that ￿rm 1 faces an unfortunate trade-o⁄. When ￿ < 1, an increase in ￿ reduces
the distortion between p1 and p2 (the joint pro￿t of ￿rms 1 and 2 will be higher for
any given p3) but increases competition with ￿rm 3. In contrast, a decrease in ￿
dampens competition with ￿rm 3, but increases the distortion between p1 and p2.
Proposition 2 A su¢ cient condition for partial ownership of ￿rm 2 to be more
pro￿table for ￿rm 1 than a complete merger is
dp￿
3
d￿ j￿=1 < 0. A necessary condition
for partial ownership to be more pro￿table for ￿rm 1 is
dp￿
3
d￿ < 0 for some ￿ ￿ 1.
Proposition 2 implies that knowing whether an increase in ￿ increases or de-
creases ￿rm 3￿ s equilibrium price is key in determining whether partial ownership
of ￿rm 2 can be more pro￿table for ￿rm 1 than a complete merger. Unfortunately,
since we would normally expect ￿rm 1￿ s price to be increasing in ￿ and ￿rm 2￿ s price
to be decreasing in ￿, and since all prices are assumed to be strategic complements,
the net e⁄ect on ￿rm 3￿ s price of an increase in ￿ cannot be determined in general.
We will now show in what follows, using a fully-speci￿ed model of demand in
which consumers are located around a unit circle and buy at most one product, that
the e⁄ect of the increase in ￿rm 2￿ s price always outweighs the e⁄ect of the decrease
in ￿rm 1￿ s price, such that ￿rm 1 always wants to acquire less than 100% of ￿rm 2.
53 Salop circle model of demand
We consider a circular city model a-la Salop (1979) with a uniform distribution of
consumers, a perimeter equal to 1, and a unitary density of consumers around the
circle.5 The three ￿rms are located equidistantly from each other, and for simplicity
all marginal and ￿xed costs are set to zero. Throughout we restrict our analysis to
outcomes with full market coverage (all consumers buy from one of the ￿rms) and in
which all three ￿rms are active in the market. We assume quadratic transportation
costs such that the location of a consumer who is indi⁄erent between buying from









2pi ￿ (pj + pk)
2t
; (4)
where i;j;k = 1;2;3, i 6= j 6= k; and p = (p1;p2;p3) is the vector of prices.
At stage 1 of the game, ￿rm 1 must decide how much of ￿rm 2 to acquire
(alternatively, with a straightforward change in notation, one can think of ￿rm 1 as
owning all the shares in ￿rm 2 and deciding whether to undertake partial divestiture
by selling some of the shares to a third party). We assume for now that with any
acquisition, ￿rm 1 will obtain corporate control over ￿rm 2, meaning that it will
control not only its own pricing decision but also the pricing decision for product 2.













Solving the ￿rst-order conditions from (5) and (6) yield the stage 2 reaction functions
5The Hotelling and Salop frameworks have become the standard tools for analyzing media
economics, see e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005), Gabszewicz et al (2004) and Peitz and Valletti
(2008). One reason for this is that unitary demand seems reasonable in the media industry (people





































price charged by ￿rm 3 depends on ￿ indirectly, through the rivals￿prices p1 and p2.

















where D = 36￿ ￿ 5(1 ￿ ￿)2 is strictly positive in the relevant area (see below).
If ￿rm 1 acquires all of ￿rm 2, then ￿rm 1 will fully internalize the fact that a
higher price on good 1 increases demand for good 2, and vice versa. In this case, it
follows from (7) that p￿
1 = p￿
2 = 5t=27 > p￿
3 = 4t=27: However, if ￿rm 1 divests itself
of some shares in ￿rm 2, or does not purchase all of ￿rm 2￿ s shares in the ￿rst place,
it will have incentives to increase the price of good 2 above 5t=27 in order to sell
more of good 1. By acquiring less than 100% of ￿rm 2, ￿rm 1 thus gives a credible
signal to ￿rm 3 that it will charge a higher price on good 2. This tends to increase
￿rm 3￿ s price, such that we ￿nd that both dp￿
2=d￿ < 0 and dp￿
3=d￿ < 0.
However, the same need not be true for p￿
1: The reason is that ￿rm 1 will be
more inclined to set a higher price on good 1 to boost demand for good 2 the larger
is its ￿nancial interests in ￿rm 2. This e⁄ect explains why dp1=d￿ > 0 if ￿ > 0:66.6
Substituting the prices in (7) into (4) yields q2(p) = 5(3￿ ￿ 1)=D: If ￿rm 1￿ s
￿nancial interest in ￿rm 2 is su¢ ciently small, ￿rm 1 will set p2 such that ￿rm 2 will
face no demand. Hence, to ensure that q2(p) ￿ 0 (and also that D > 0), we assume




At stage 1 ￿rm 1 chooses how much of ￿rm 2 to acquire in order to maximize
the joint pro￿t on products 1 and 2 given the equilibrium stage 2 prices in (7)
6For ￿ < :66, the decrease in ￿rm 3￿ s price that occurs for an increase in ￿ is su¢ ciently strong
to induce ￿rm 1￿ s price on good 1 also to decrease in ￿, implying that in this case, dp1=d￿ < 0.




1 + (1 ￿ ￿)




It follows immediately that partial ownership of ￿rm 2 is more pro￿table for ￿rms
1 and 2 than full ownership as long as 36￿ > 79(1￿￿)2; i.e. as long as ￿ > e ￿ ￿ 0:52.
Solving for the acquisition share that maximizes the two ￿rms￿joint pro￿t yields
￿






Proposition 3 Partial ownership by ￿rm 1 is more pro￿table for ￿rms 1 and 2 than
a complete merger for all ￿ 2 [e ￿;1). Their joint pro￿ts are maximized at ￿ = ￿
￿:
The key to this result is the e⁄ect an increase in ownership has on the price of
￿rm 3￿ s product. Since dp￿
3=d￿ < 0, it follows that relative to the case of a merger
between ￿rms 1 and 2, ￿rm 3￿ s price will be higher when ￿rm 1 does not own all
of ￿rm 2 but nevertheless has corporate control. A higher price on ￿rm 3￿ s product
bene￿ts ￿rms 1 and 2, and this bene￿t is enough to more than o⁄set the gain ￿rms
1 and 2 could have achieved by merging and thereby fully coordinating their prices.
Substituting the joint-pro￿t maximizing ownership share, ￿ = ￿
￿, into the equi-
librium prices in (7) yields the following comparative-static result on ￿rm prices:
Proposition 4 At the optimal ownership share ￿ = ￿
￿, ￿rm 1 sets a lower price on
product 1 and a higher price on product 2, and ￿rm 3 sets a higher price on product
3, relative to the prices that would have occurred had ￿rms 1 and 2 fully merged.
Since prices are observable, the result in Proposition 4 gives rise to a testable
prediction: starting from a situation in which ￿rm 1 initially owns all of ￿rm 2,
suppose ￿rm 1 optimally divests some of its shares of ￿rm 2. Then, we would expect
the prices of products 2 and 3 to increase and the price of product 1 to decrease.
For completeness, we now consider the e⁄ect of partial ownership on the ￿rms￿
operating pro￿ts. Substituting p￿
1, p￿
2, and p￿
3 into each ￿rm￿ s pro￿t yields
￿2 =
50t(1 + 5￿)(3￿ ￿ 1)
9D2 ; (10)
￿1 =
50t(3 ￿ ￿)(5 + ￿)￿
2




8It is straightforward to show from (10) that the pro￿ts earned on products 1 and 3
are decreasing in ￿, whereas the pro￿t earned on product 2 is increasing in ￿.
3.1 Fight for corporate control
We have shown that it is optimal for ￿rm 1 to engage in only a partial acquisition
of ￿rm 2, under the assumption that it will control all pricing decisions. Therefore,
two important questions are: how reasonable is this assumption, and will the owners
of the remaining shares have an incentive to try to wrest this control from ￿rm 1?
Although having the incentive to ￿ght ex post for corporate control of ￿rm 2￿ s
pricing decisions does not necessarily mean these other owners will be successful,
nevertheless, the partial acquisition of ￿rm 2 might be more appealing to ￿rm 1 if
these other owners did not have such incentives. In this subsection, we investigate
whether and under what conditions ￿rm 1 can expect a subsequent ￿ght for control.
Assume for the moment that these other owners are able to wrest corporate
control of ￿rm 2￿ s pricing decision. Then stage two prices will be chosen to maximize
max
p1
= p1q1(p) + ￿p2q2(p);
max
p2












2t(53 + 39￿ ￿ 3(1 ￿ ￿)2)
27(10 ￿ ￿)







where ￿12 is the pro￿t from product 1 and ￿ share of the pro￿t from product 2, ~ ￿2
is (1 ￿ ￿) share of the pro￿t from product 2, and ￿3 is the pro￿t from product 3.
Comparing the overall value of ￿rm 2 (i.e., ￿p2q2(p) + (1 ￿ ￿)p2q2(p)) with and
without the transfer of corporate control to ￿rm 1 yields the following result.
Proposition 5 There is no incentive for the non-￿rm 1 owners to ￿ght ex-post for
corporate control of ￿rm 2￿ s pricing decision as long as ￿ 2 [b ￿;1), where b ￿ ￿ 0:623:
9This result is illustrated in Figure 1, where the broken line shows the value of
￿rm 2 when ￿rm 1 has corporate control and the solid line shows the value of ￿rm
2 when ￿rm 1 does not have corporate control. The ￿ that maximizes the ex post
joint pro￿t of ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2, ￿ = ￿
￿ ￿ 0:619 (c.f. Proposition 3), is slightly below
the level that would induce a ￿ght by the non-￿rm 1 owners, ￿ = b ￿ ￿ 0:623. As a
consequence, the other owners of ￿rm 2 would have an incentive to try to capture
corporate control of ￿rm 2 if ￿rm 1 were to acquire ￿ = ￿
￿. To avoid this, ￿rm 1
may simply prefer to acquire a larger ownership share ￿, such that ￿ ￿ b ￿ > ￿
￿.
Figure 1: Firm 1￿ s ownership share and the possibility of ￿ght for corporate
control.
As discussed in the introduction, much of the partial-ownership literature as-
sumes quantity competition in the product market. However, it is straightforward
to show that the result in Proposition 5 that the joint pro￿t of ￿rms 1 and 2 is higher
when ￿rm 1 partially owns ￿rm 2 holds only under price competition. Hence, price
competition (or more precisely, strategic complements) is a necessary condition.
103.2 Asymmetric location
We have assumed that the ￿rms were symmetrically located along the Salop circle.
Suppose instead, as in Figure 2, that the distance between ￿rms 1 and 2 is y; and
the distance between ￿rms 2 and 3 and 1 and 3 is (1 ￿ y)=2: Then, assuming all





pi (1 + y) ￿ pj (1 ￿ y) ￿ 2yp3














Figure 2: Asymmetric localization.
Under the assumption that ￿rm 1 has control over both its own and ￿rm 2￿ s
pricing decisions, the stage 2 equilibrium prices are given by
p1 =
￿ (4 ￿ (1 ￿ y)(1 ￿ ￿))
2Dy (3 + y)
￿1 (1 ￿ y)
￿1ty; p2 =
4 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(y + 3)
2Dy (3 + y)




8y (3 ￿ y)￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2 (1 ￿ 3y)(1 ￿ y)
4Dy
t(1 ￿ y); (14)
where the denominator Dy is given by Dy ￿ 24y￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2 (1 ￿ y)(2 ￿ y):
Using equations (13) and (14), pro￿ts for the three ￿rms can be expressed as
￿1 =
ty￿
2 (1 + 3y ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ y))(3 + y ￿ ￿(1 ￿ y))
4D2
y (3 + y)
￿2 (1 ￿ y)
￿1 ;
11￿2 =
(￿(1 ￿ 3y) ￿ y)((1 ￿ ￿)y ￿ 3￿ ￿ 1)yt
4D2
y (3 + y)




t((1 ￿ ￿)2 (1 ￿ 3y)(1 ￿ y) ￿ 8y￿ (3 ￿ y))




At stage 1, ￿rm 1 chooses ￿ to solve max￿ (￿1 + ￿2); which yields
￿
￿(y) = 1 for y ￿ 1=5;
￿
￿(y) = 1 ￿
4y (1 ￿ 5y) + 2
p
2y (5y ￿ 1)(1 + y)(6 ￿ 3y2 + y)
3(1 ￿ y)(y2 + 5y + 2)
for y ￿ 1=5:
Intuitively, if y ￿ 1=5, products 1 and 2 are such close substitutes that ￿rm 1 prefers
to have complete ￿nancial control over both ￿rms. However, if the goods are poorer
substitutes, ￿rm 1 maximizes the joint pro￿t by acquiring only a fraction of ￿rm 2,
the less so the greater is y. This is illustrated by the solid curve in Figure 3.
If the other ￿rm 2 owners acquire corporate control in ￿rm 2, we ￿nd that
￿2 =
(1 ￿ y2)(y + 3)
4 yt
8(6 + 17y ￿ 2￿ ￿ 3(1 ￿ ￿)y + 3y2 + (1 ￿ ￿)y2)
2:
The dotted curve ￿
C(y) in Figure 3 shows the combinations of y and ￿ where the
other owners of ￿rm 2 are just indi⁄erent to ￿ghting for corporate control. If ￿rm
1￿ s share is less than ￿
C(y), the other owners will ￿ght for control, but will otherwise
prefer that control rest with ￿rm 1. By choosing ￿ = ￿
C(y) for y > y# ￿ 0:32 and
￿ = ￿
￿(y) for y < y#; ￿rm 1 can thus avoid a struggle for corporate control:
We can summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 6 If products 1 and 2 are su¢ ciently close substitutes that y ￿ 0:2,
then ￿rm 1 prefers to have full ￿nancial control over both ￿rms. Otherwise ￿rm
1 prefers to purchase less than 100% of the shares in ￿rm 2. If products 1 and 2
are su¢ ciently poor substitutes that y > y#; then ￿rm 1 will purchase the number
of shares in ￿rm 2 that maximizes the joint value of the two ￿rms, and the other
owners of ￿rm 2 (silent investor) will have no incentive to ￿ght for corporate control.
12Figure 3: Asymmetric location; corporate and ￿nancial control.
4 The market for pay-TV in Scandinavia
Demand and supply conditions in the Norwegian and Swedish markets for pay-TV
broadcasting are similar along many dimensions. In both countries there are two
providers o⁄ering pay-TV-subscriptions via satellite (Canal Digital and Viasat), and
for the majority of households the only alternative to satellite subscription is the
digital terrestrial platform (DTT). Within this platform, there is only one ￿rm in
each of the Scandinavian countries (RTV in Norway and Boxer in Sweden) However,
despite these similarities, the price pictures in Norway and Sweden di⁄er markedly.
Table 1 provides two illustrations of this. First, we see that the subscription
fee at RTV is signi￿cantly higher than at Boxer (only a small portion of the price
di⁄erence can be explained by the generally higher price level in Norway compared
to Sweden). Second, we see that Canal Digital charges a lower price than its DTT
competitor in Norway but a higher price than its DTT competitor in Sweden. A
similar pattern holds for the prices charged by Viasat relative to RTV and Boxer.
It is not surprising that Canal Digital (and Viasat) has a higher subscription fee
than Sweden￿ s Boxer. Indeed, this is consistent with the general view that a large
13fraction of the customers in Sweden consider the DTT platform as inferior to the
satellite platform. The reason is because of limits in the number of channels that
may be provided in premium packages via DTT (as well as limits in the ability to
provide HDTV-quality). But why, then, is RTV more expensive than satellite in
Norway? And why is DTT so much more expensive in Norway than in Sweden?
1.87 $ 210
Relative price CD/Boxer Price Boxer Sweden
0.62 $ 490
Relative price CD/RTV Price RTV Norway
1.87 $ 210
Relative price CD/Boxer Price Boxer Sweden
0.62 $ 490
Relative price CD/RTV Price RTV Norway
Table 1: Yearly pay-TV prices (subscription fees) in Norway and Sweden.
We suggest that the di⁄erence in ownership structures in the two countries may
provide an explanation. Important in this respect is the fact that Boxer is an
independently-owned company, while the Norwegian telecommunications incumbent
Telenor owns 100% of the shares in Canal Digital and 33.3% of the shares in RTV.
Let us ￿rst assume (we think erroneously) that Telenor has no corporate control
in RTV, and thus is a passive investor in that company. In this case, one would
expect the ￿nancial interests in RTV will give Telenor an incentive to raise the price
of Canal Digital in Norway relative to Sweden, since some of the pro￿t associated
with reduced sales of Canal Digital in Norway will be recaptured through Telenor￿ s
stake in RTV. However, this prediction is inconsistent with the above observation,
since we then should expect the price for satellite access to be relatively higher
than for DTT access in Norway compared to Sweden. Neither can Telenor￿ s partial
￿nancial interest in RTV explain why RTV charges a much higher price than Boxer.
The assumption that Telenor is a passive investor in RTV also does not seem
likely to hold because the other two shareholders in RTV, NRK and TV2, the largest
broadcasters in Norway, have no experience with operating distribution platforms.
14This suggests that Telenor to a large extent will likely be able to control RTV￿ s
competitive decision making, including pricing decisions. At the outset one might
think that NRK and TV2 would be unwilling to let Telenor have corporate control,
since Telenor also owns the competitor Canal Digital. However, as shown above￿
and this is one of the main points of our analysis￿ it is precisely in such a situation
that it might be suboptimal for NRK and TV2 to ￿ght for corporate control.
Suppose, therefore, that Telenor has corporate control in RTV as well as in
Canal Digital. Then Telenor will have an incentive to increase RTV￿ s price in order
to reduce the competitive pressure on Canal Digital. If Telenor owned 100 % of the
shares in both companies, Telenor would induce RTV and Canal Digital to set the
same (high) prices, other things being equal. However, since Telenor only has 33% of
the shares in RTV, it will have incentives to set a higher price for the services o⁄ered
by RTV than for the services o⁄ered by Canal Digital in Norway (c.f Proposition 2
above). This might be true even if consumption of the former has a lower perceived
quality. Our model can therefore shed some light on the price patterns in Table 1.
By its very nature, we cannot directly compare the actual outcome in Scandinavia
with a counterfactual case where Telenor has a larger partial ￿nancial interest in
RTV. However, the digital terrestrial platform was established in 2007, and prior
to this the analogue terrestrial platform was the only alternative to direct-to-home
satellite access for the majority of households. The analogue terrestrial platform in
Norway was owned by Telenor. Hence, when this platform was replaced with the
digital terrestrial platform, Telenor￿ s ￿nancial stake in the only alternative to the
satellite platform was signi￿cantly reduced. Consistent with our model, the data
reveals that subsequent to the introduction of the DTT platform in Norway, Canal
Digital reduced its prices, and has become relatively more aggressive than Viasat.
The case at hand also has similarities with a recent merger case in the UK (The
BSkyB/ITV case). In 2006, the largest pay-TV provider BSkyB announced that
it had acquired 17.9 per cent of shares in ITV. The UK Competition Commission
(2007) concluded that the transaction would give BSkyB a signi￿cant degree of
corporate control in ITV. The Commission￿ s view was that BSkyB would have an
incentive and ability to weaken the competitive constraint ITV has on BSkyB. The
15Commission felt that BSkyB￿ s shareholding in ITV should be reduced below 7.5%,
since this would then restrict the BSkyB￿ s ability to have corporate control in ITV.
5 Conclusion
The competitive e⁄ects of mergers are well understood. Two ￿rms that previously
were independent, by merging, are now able to coordinate their output and pricing
decisions. In the case where the ￿rms produce substitute products, this leads them￿
in the absence of any cost savings￿ to charge higher prices and/or to cut back on
their outputs. It is well known, however, that this e⁄ect can be trumped if rival
￿rms in the market are thereby induced to become more aggressive (see Salant et
al, 1983). Hence, much of the literature on the pro￿tability of mergers turns on
whether the merger would induce rival ￿rms to become more or less aggressive.
Our starting point is a situation in which the merger would induce rival ￿rms to
become less aggressive. This presumably is a best-case scenario for a merger to be
pro￿table, as the dampening-of-competition e⁄ect seemingly works in the merger￿ s
favor. Nevertheless, we have shown in this paper that a merger (in the usual sense of
acquiring 100% ￿nancial interest in a rival) may not be the optimal strategy for the
would-be merging ￿rms. Instead, we have shown that the joint pro￿t of the acquiring
￿rm and the acquired ￿rm can be higher if the acquiring ￿rm purchases less than
100% of the shares in the acquired ￿rm. Although this results in pricing and output
distortions that disadvantage it relative to the pro￿t a merged ￿rm would earn all
else being equal, the distortions can in some cases lead to a further dampening of
competition￿ -which may more than o⁄set the original loss due to the distortions.
This has implications for competition policy. Consider a case in which two
out of three ￿rms in a market are owned by one stakeholder. Should competition
authorities intervene if the owner wants to sell say 30% of the shares of one of
these ￿rms to a passive investor? Our analysis suggests that this could worsen
competition. By the same token, assume that competition authorities would allow
a merger between two out of three ￿rms in a market (due to e¢ ciency gains). If the
acquiring ￿rm wants to buy say 70% of the shares in the acquired ￿rm instead of
16all the shares, should the competition authorities require it to buy all the shares?
To our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to look at the pro￿tability of partial
ownership arrangements when the acquiring ￿rm obtains corporate control. Never-
theless, there is much scope for future work. Given that general results are di¢ cult
to obtain with di⁄erentiated products, one avenue for future research is to assess
whether and to what extent the results may hold in other demand contexts (e.g.,
in models with vertical as well as horizontal product di⁄erentiation). It may also
be fruitful to look at the e⁄ects of agency relationships, in which the acquiring ￿rm
hires an agent to carry out its instructions. In these settings, one could then allow
for corporate control that is not an all or nothing proposition. One might expect the
optimal contract in this case (assuming it were publicly observed) to incentivize the
agent to give fractional weights to the interests of both the acquiring ￿rm and the
acquired ￿rm when setting prices, which can potentially lead to a richer analysis.
176 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Given p3, the pro￿t-maximizing p1 and p2 are given by


























































































der symmetry when ￿ = 1, it follows that
dp1
d￿ > 0 and
dp2
d￿ < 0 as in the Proposition.
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